On October 13, Emmanuel Macron received Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno at the Élysée Palace. Their defence ministers signed a declaration of intent the same day to relaunch military cooperation between the two countries. The last French soldiers had left Chad nearly twenty months earlier.
Less than two years ago, this same government was asking the French military to pack up and leave. Now it is back at the negotiating table with Paris on defence. Having been pushed out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, France needs to regain access to the region. Chad, surrounded by crises, is looking for partners who can fill the gaps in its security capabilities. Which of the two stands to gain the most?
The October meeting followed several others. The two presidents had met in Paris in late January and again in Nairobi in May. As early as January, there had been talk of rebuilding relations on the basis of mutual interests. The agreement signed at the Élysée Palace marks the culmination of several months of discussions conducted away from the cameras.
From Operation Épervier to the Break
Launched in 1986, Operation Épervier established a French military presence in Chad that lasted nearly three decades. When Operation Barkhane took over in 2014, Paris once again placed its command headquarters in N’Djamena.
A glance at the map is enough to understand why. Chad sits at the centre of a region stretching from southern Libya to western Sudan, and from the Central African Republic to the border with Niger. It is difficult to imagine a better position from which to monitor the region’s armed groups.
This presence also helped protect the government in power. In 2008, when rebels advanced on N’Djamena, France provided intelligence and logistical support to President Idriss Déby. According to his critics, France was indirectly supporting the regime, and the country’s sovereignty became a subject of public debate.
N’Djamena terminated the defence agreement on November 28, 2024, to Paris’s surprise. The last of approximately 1,000 French troops left on January 30, 2025. Déby considered the agreement a relic of another era and wanted Chad to make its own security decisions. Unlike the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), however, Chad never severed its diplomatic and economic ties with France.
Politically, the move had an impact. On the ground, much remained to be done. Chad would now have to monitor its airspace, evacuate wounded personnel and supply remote military outposts without French support. Independence can be proclaimed in a day, but building the institutions that make it a reality takes years.
A Neighbourhood Without Respite
The departure of French forces had no impact, positive or negative, on the threats surrounding the country. The war in Sudan is spilling across its eastern border, instability in Libya weighs on the north, and armed groups around Lake Chad continue to harass the military in the west.
On May 4, an attack attributed to Boko Haram against a military position on Barka Tolorom Island killed at least 23 Chadian soldiers and wounded 26. The army said it had repelled the assault and inflicted heavy losses on the attackers. Every raid of this kind highlights the importance of the country’s intelligence and rapid-response capabilities.
Sudan also places pressure on Chad in another way. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Chad was hosting approximately 1.56 million refugees and asylum seekers at the end of July, including more than 940,000 people who had arrived from Sudan since April 2023. Around Lake Chad, approximately 219,000 people have been forced to flee their homes.
It is hardly surprising that Déby is reopening the door to a former partner. That does not mean he is closing it to others. In recent years, N’Djamena has purchased drones from Türkiye, received financial support from the United Arab Emirates and maintained contact with Moscow. The Chadian Air Force was reportedly spotted operating Aksungur drones in April 2024, following the acquisition of three Hürkuş-C light attack aircraft and two ANKA drones. Each partner provides specific capabilities, and a surveillance drone cannot do the job of a helicopter or a transport aircraft.
Chad also wants to manufacture some of the equipment it needs. In August, it established a state-owned company, Sahel Défense Industrie, tasked with developing domestic military production and technical expertise. The road from establishing a company to producing the first components in a factory will be long. Nevertheless, N’Djamena’s expectations of its partners, including Türkiye, are becoming clear. It wants technology transfers, training and maintenance support rather than simple equipment sales.
For Déby, diversifying suppliers means reducing the political cost of dependence on any one of them. I see no sign of regret in this return to Paris. Chad is adding another card to its hand and intends to exert more influence over the terms of cooperation than it did in the past.
What Paris Wants to Regain
On the French side, security does not explain everything. Since being forced out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the French military has lost almost all its operational capabilities in the Sahel. Chad is not a member of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and has never severed ties with Paris. It is the capital where France has the greatest chance of re-establishing a foothold.
The Élysée Palace says security cooperation resumed in early 2026, covering training, equipment and intelligence sharing. A senior Chadian officer told AFP that French intelligence officers were working in N’Djamena and that a French surveillance aircraft was flying over the Lake Chad border area.
Le Monde, citing Chadian military sources, reports that around twenty French military personnel have been training Chadian units in Moussoro and Massaguet since the summer. Those being trained include members of the Rapid Intervention Force, which helps protect the president. France has not confirmed these reports. Paris is also reportedly considering delivering two helicopters and a military transport aircraft, although no decision has been made at this stage.
According to the Élysée Palace, the October 13 declaration establishes a framework for cooperation in training, expertise, industry and technology. The aim is to help Chadian forces develop their capabilities in innovative fields.
The arrangement involves relatively few personnel and keeps a low profile, making it less expensive as well. Paris presumably understands that reopening its former bases in their previous form would trigger immediate opposition. Once presented as guarantors of security, those bases had ultimately become a prime target of anti-French protests.
Economically, N’Djamena is setting the priorities. On September 25, a business forum organised in Paris with MEDEF International brought together around 250 Chadian and French companies to discuss priorities defined by Chad. The aim was to mobilise funding for the “Chad Connection 2030” plan, which envisages nearly $30 billion in investment. Memoranda of understanding were signed at the forum, including agreements concerning a dry port project in Toukra and the construction of healthcare centres, but their financial value was not disclosed. N’Djamena will assess this cooperation based on the projects that actually get underway on the ground.
N’Djamena’s Terms
In Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey, this rapprochement will be watched closely. Some will see it as an attempt by Paris to return to regional security through the Chadian gateway. N’Djamena, for its part, is taking advantage of its ability to engage with everyone.
Ankara also has good reason to follow developments closely. Türkiye’s defence cooperation in Africa focuses on technical training and capacity-building, but Chad has now diversified its options. It is worth noting that Türkiye and Chad signed a defence industry cooperation agreement in 2017. Ultimately, what matters is the results on the ground. The better the Chadian military becomes at maintaining an operational system over the long term, the more valuable its partnership with the country supplying that system will become. The return of French forces does not change this equation.
Not everyone in Chad is applauding the move. On October 13, the opposition party Tchad Uni issued a statement calling for agreements with France to respect human rights, democratic principles and transparency, and to ensure that Chadian interests do not take a back seat. The government had presented the departure of French troops as an act of sovereignty. To maintain its credibility, it will have to publicly disclose the contents of the new partnership and allow institutions to scrutinise it.
The text signed on October 13 is not a comprehensive defence agreement, and no permanent military base has been announced. No one can say whether Paris regrets leaving. What is clear, however, is that France is trying to regain what it lost, while Déby now has greater room for negotiation than he had when French troops were stationed on Chadian soil. Smaller training teams and intelligence support could replace the bases that closed last year. How far this return will go is a decision that will be made in N’Djamena.
Göktuğ Çalışkan is a doctoral candidate in international relations at the Centre for Global Studies at the International University of Rabat (UIR). His research focuses on the Sahel, security and relations between Africa and external powers.
Disclaimer: The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policy of TRT Afrika.
